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Using the ellipsoid method, both Deng et al. [Deng, X., Q. Fang, X. Sun. 2006. Finding nucleolus of ﬂow game. Proc. 17th
ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms. ACM Press, New York, 124–131] and Potters et al. [Potters, J., H. Reijnierse,
A. Biswas. 2006. The nucleolus of balanced simple ﬂow networks. Games Econom. Behav. 54 205–225] show that the
nucleolus of simple ﬂow games (where all edge capacities are equal to one) can be computed in polynomial time. Our main
result is a combinatorial method based on eliminating redundant s–t path constraints such that only a polynomial number of
constraints remains. This leads to efﬁcient algorithms for computing the core, nucleolus, and nucleon of simple ﬂow games.
Deng et al. also prove that computing the nucleolus for (general) ﬂow games is NP-hard. We generalize this by proving that
computing the f -nucleolus of ﬂow games is NP-hard for all priority functions f that satisfy f A > 0 for all coalitions A
with worth vA > 0 (so, including the priority functions corresponding to the nucleolus, nucleon, and per-capita nucleolus).
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1. Introduction. A cooperative game is given by a set E of players and a characteristic function v
 2E →
with v= 0. A coalition is any subset A⊆ E. We refer to vA as the worth of coalition A⊆ E, interpreted
as the gain that the members of A can achieve by “cooperating” with each other. The worth vE is also called
the total worth of the game. The v-worths of many cooperative games are derived from solving an underlying
discrete optimization problem (cf. Bilbao [1]). For example, in a matching game, the underlying discrete structure
is an undirected graph G with edge weights w ∈ E+. If this graph is bipartite we get an assignment game
(Shapley and Shubik [28]). The players are represented by the vertices of G, and the worth vA of a coalition
A is deﬁned as the size of a maximum weight matching in the subgraph of G induced by A. Another example
is the class of min-cost spanning tree games (Bird [2]) deﬁned on an undirected complete graph G with supply
node s and edge weighting w. The players are the vertices of G without s, and the (cost) worth vA of a
coalition A is equal to the weight of a minimum spanning tree in the subgraph of G induced by A∪ s.
In cooperative game theory it is often assumed that the grand coalition E is formed. The central problem
is then to allocate the total worth vE to the individual players i ∈ E in a way that might be called “fair”
(in a certain sense). An allocation is a vector x ∈E with xE= vE. Here, we adopt the standard notation
xA=∑i∈A xi. A solution concept  for a class of cooperative games  is a function that maps each game
E v ∈  to a set  v of allocations for E v. These allocations are called  -allocations and we say that 
prescribes them to E v.
The choice for a speciﬁc solution concept depends on the notion of “fairness” that has been speciﬁed within
the decision model. Well-known solution concepts in the literature are the core (Gillies [14]), which might
be empty, and the nucleolus, which consists of a unique allocation (Schmeidler [26]). See Owen [23] for a
survey. Multiplicative variants of the nucleolus are the nucleon (Faigle et al. [8]) (also called the proportional
nucleolus (Young et al. [34])), and the per-capita nucleolus (Grotte [17], Young [33]) (also called the weak
nucleolus (Shapley [27])). Both variants can be more natural to model situations in which taxation is imposed
proportionally to the worth (e.g., interest or sales tax). Later, we give precise deﬁnitions of these concepts and
discuss them in the more general framework of f -nucleoli, where f 
 2E → + is a so-called priority function
that has been introduced in Wallmeier [31]. Priority functions are closely related to the concept of taxation
functions (Tijs and Driessen [30]), Woeginger [32] and have been studied in Faigle et al. [6], Paulusma [24]
as well.
Two natural questions regarding the complexity of a certain solution concept  v are determining the com-
putational complexity of
(1) testing membership in  v, i.e., checking whether a given allocation is a member of  v; and
(2) computing an allocation in  v.
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To answer these questions, one takes the size of the underlying discrete structure as input size because this
is more natural than taking the 2E v-worths themselves. Both positive and negative results exist regarding
these two questions. As an illustration, consider the earlier mentioned matching games and min-cost spanning
tree games. In Faigle et al. [7] it has been shown that testing membership in the core of min-cost spanning
tree games is NP-hard, while this can be done in polynomial time for matching games (Faigle et al. [8]). For
assignment games (Solymosi and Raghavan [29]) and simple matching games (i.e., with unit edge weights)
(Kern and Paulusma [21]), the nucleolus can be computed in polynomial time. For (general) matching games,
an allocation in the nucleon (Faigle et al. [8]) can be computed in polynomial time. For min-cost spanning tree
games, computing the nucleolus (Faigle et al. [9]) and computing an allocation in the nucleon (Faigle et al. [6])
are NP-hard problems. Note that in these games the v-worths themselves can be computed efﬁciently.
This paper studies ﬂow games introduced by Kalai and Zemel [19] to model proﬁt allocation of integrated
production systems with alternative production routes. The underlying structure of a ﬂow game E v is a (ﬂow)
network, i.e., a directed graph G= V E with source s ∈ V , sink t ∈ V and positive edge capacities c ∈ E .
Note that we allow multiple edges. Each player in this game owns exactly one edge. Players cooperate with
each other to allow a ﬂow going from s to t. So, players are represented by (directed) edges and the v-worths
are given by
vA 
=maximum ﬂow in V A A⊆E
Note that v-worths can be efﬁciently computed (see, e.g., Edmonds and Karp [5]) and that vA = 0 for a
coalition A that does not contain both s and t. Kalai and Zemel [20] show that every ﬂow game has a nonempty
core and that it is a trivial task to compute a core allocation. However, Fang et al. [11] show that testing
membership in the core of a ﬂow game is NP-hard. Deng et al. [4] show that computing the nucleolus of a ﬂow
game is NP-hard. On the positive side, Granot and Granot [15] show that the nucleolus of a ﬂow game can be
computed in polynomial time if the underlying ﬂow network is an augmented tree.
A simple ﬂow game is a ﬂow game on a simple network, i.e., with unit capacities (ce = 1 for all e ∈ E).
Granot and Granot [15] obtain a parametric description of the core of a simple ﬂow game and use this result to
obtain an easier description of its nucleolus. However, their work does not lead to a polynomial time algorithm
for computing the nucleolus. The main obstacle is that their approach requires checking for pairs of edges ab
if there exists an s–t path that goes through a but not through b. Here, a v0–vl path in a network G= V E
is a directed path from v0 ∈ V to vl ∈ V , i.e., a sequence v0v1 · · ·vl of different vertices such that vi−1 vi is
a (directed) edge in G for i = 1     l. By writing a= x y, the above problem is equivalent to checking if
there exist an s–x path and a y–t path in G′ = V E\b that are vertex-disjoint. The problem of deciding if
such paths exist is NP-complete for directed graphs (Fortune et al. [12]).
Fourteen years later, both Deng et al. [4] and Potters et al. [25] independently show that the nucleolus of a
simple ﬂow game can be computed in polynomial time. Both papers use the ellipsoid method, as opposed to the
approach in Granot and Granot [15] that is based on removing redundant s–t path constraints in the sequence
of linear programs that determine the nucleolus (we will explain this sequence of linear programs later). Potters
et al. [25] also make use of a polynomial description of the core in terms of so-called potential functions deﬁned
on a (modiﬁed) network.
Other properties of simple ﬂow games, such as core stability and core largeness, are studied in Fang et al. [10],
while Granot et al. [16] studies the reactive bargaining set.
Our results. We continue the study on ﬂow games. First we focus on simple ﬂow games in §2. We attack
these games by a similar approach as followed in Granot and Granot [15]: in the linear program descriptions
of the solution concepts under consideration we try to ﬁnd as many redundant s–t path constraints as possible.
However, our analysis is very different than the one performed in Granot and Granot [15] because in the end
we are left with a polynomial number of constraints (not necessarily corresponding to s–t paths) describing the
following three solution concepts:
• In §2.1 we will exhibit a new, polynomial size description of the core of a simple ﬂow game.
• In §2.2 we show that the nucleolus of a simple ﬂow game can be computed in polynomial time.
• In §2.3 we show that the nucleon of a simple ﬂow game can be computed in polynomial time.
We would like to emphasize that our method does not rely on the ellipsoid method, as opposed to the “dual”
approach in Deng et al. [4], Potters et al. [25] for computing the nucleolus in polynomial time, and (hopefully)
provides some additional insight into the structure of the problem.
In §3 we study the f -nucleolus of a (general) ﬂow game. We give a relatively short proof that shows that com-
puting an allocation in the f -nucleolus is NP-hard for all priority functions f with f A > 0 if vA > 0. As for
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Figure 1. Two examples of simple networks.
min-cost spanning tree games, this is known only for a smaller subset of priority functions (Faigle et al. [6]);
this result was not expected beforehand. The nucleolus, per-capita nucleolus and nucleon all correspond to a
priority function satisfying this property. Hence we immediately obtain the NP-hardness results for these three
concepts.
Section 4 contains the conclusions. There we also mention some open problems.
2. Simple ﬂow games. Consider a simple network V E. Throughout this section we use the following
terminology. For two nonempty vertex-disjoint sets ST ⊂ V with S ∪ T = V , s ∈ S, and t ∈ T , we write S 
 T 
for the cut i j ∈ E  i ∈ S j ∈ T  and T 
 S for j i ∈ E  i ∈ S j ∈ T . A min cut is a cut with the
smallest number of edges. By the well-known max-ﬂow min-cut theorem (cf. Cormen et al. [3]), vE is equal
to the number of edges in a min cut.
A min cut edge is an edge e ∈ E that is contained in some min cut S 
 T ⊆ E. A reverse edge is an edge
e ∈ T 
 S for some min cut S 
 T ⊆E. We let M denote the set of min cut edges and we let R denote the set of
reverse edges. Note that M ∩R= (we make this more explicit in Observation 1). In general, there might exist
edges that are neither reverse nor min cut edges. We let D 
= E\M ∪R denote the set of dummy edges. See
Figure 1 for two examples. In this ﬁgure the letters D, M , R denote the set to which the edges in the example
networks belong. Both R and M (and consequently D) can be computed in polynomial time as follows. We say
that we identify two vertices i, j if we replace i, j by a new vertex adjacent to all edges formerly adjacent to
i or j . Then, an edge e= i j is in M if and only if identifying i with s and j with t (still) yields a min cut
value of vE. Similarly, an edge e= i j is in R if and only if identifying i with t and j with s yields a min
cut value of vE.
Let  ⊆ 2E denote the family of s–t paths. Recall that these are directed paths starting in s and ending in t.
We deﬁne a max ﬂow set in a simple network as a set of k pairwise edge-disjoint paths P1     Pk in  that
form a max ﬂow of worth k= vE.
Observation 1. Let P1     Pk be a max ﬂow set in a simple network V E. Then M ⊆ P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk
and P1 ∪ · · · ∪Pk∩R=.
Proof. Let P1     Pk be a max ﬂow set in V E. Every Pi (i = 1     k) passes through every (min)
cut of G. Furthermore, every min cut contains k edges. These two facts together imply our claim. 
From now on we ﬁx some max ﬂow set P1     Pk. Note that besides s, t these paths may have other
common vertices. An i–j path P is denoted by P ij and an i–j subpath of a path Pl is denoted by P
ij
l . A subpath
P ′ ⊆ Pl ∩M joining i ∈ V M to j ∈ V M is denoted by Mijl . A path P ′ ⊆ D ∪ R joining i ∈ V to j ∈ V is
denoted by Qij . However, we write Rij if we want to indicate that Qij ∩ R =  (so a path Rij might contain
edges from D). Note that this is exactly the case when i and j are separated by a min cut. Otherwise, all edges
of any path Qij belong to D, and if we want to indicate this we denote Qij by Dij . We can then decompose an
arbitrary P ∈ as
P =Dsi1 ∪Mi1j1l1 ∪Qj1i2 ∪M
i2j2
l2
∪ · · · ∪Qjq−1iq ∪Miqjqlq ∪Djqt (1)
We observe that P cannot pass any reverse edges before passing any min cut, so P indeed starts and ends with
(possibly empty) Dsi1 , respectively, Djqt .
We now deﬁne two polynomially bounded sets 0 ⊆ and 1 ⊂ 2E that play a crucial role in all our proofs
in this section. Whenever i j ∈ V M2 are joined by a path in D∪R, we ﬁx such a path Qij . If Qij ∩R = ,
then we write Rij . In the other case Qij ⊆D holds, and we denote Qij by Dij . Then 0 consists of all paths of
the form
P = Psil ∪ Dij ∪Pjtm 
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Here, we allow i= j . Then, as Dii is empty for all i ∈ V , we ensure P1     Pk ∈0. The set 1 consists of all
s–t walks of the form
P = Psil ∪ Rij ∪Pjtm 
Note that it is indeed possible that a coalition P ∈1 is not a path coalition because we might visit a vertex or
edge twice by going from s to t along P , e.g., when l=m. We also note that Rii does not exist.
Observation 2. Both 0 and 1 have polynomial size and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Clearly, 0 = 1 = OV 2k2 = OV 2E2 . The second claim immediately follows from the
fact that we can compute DR and a max ﬂow set in polynomial time. 
The following lemma is crucial for every solution concept in this section. Note that the coalitions P* deﬁned
in this lemma are in 0 ∪1.
Lemma 2.1. Let P ∈ be decomposed as in (1) and let
P* = Psj*l* Qj*i*+1P
i*+1t
l*+1 for *= 1     q− 1
Let x≡ 0 on D∪R for some x ∈E . Then the following holds:
• If q = 1, then xP= xPl1.
• If q = 2, then xP= x P1.
• If q ≥ 3, then xP= x P1+
∑q−1
*=2x P*− xPl*.
Proof. As x ≡ 0 on D ∪R we may without loss of generality assume Dsi1 = Psi1l1 and Djqt = P
jqt
lq
. For the
same reason we may without loss of generality assume that Qj*i*+1 equals Qj*i*+1 .
If q = 1, we then obtain xP= xDsi1+ xMi1j1l1 + xDj1t= xP
si1
l1
+ xP i1j1l1 + xP
j1t
l1
= xPl1.
If q = 2, we obtain xP= xDsi1+ xMi1j1l1 + xQj1i2+ xM
i2j2
l2
+ xDj2t= xP sj1l1 + x Qj1i2+ xP
i2t
l2
=
x P1.
If q ≥ 3, we identify each path P with its incidence vector in E+. Then we can write P + Pl2 + · · · + Plq−1 =P1+ · · ·+ Pq−1, and the claim follows. 
2.1. The core of simple ﬂow games. The core of a game E v, denoted by corev, is the set of allocations
that are fair in the sense that every coalition A gets at least its worth vA (assuming that the v-worths represent
proﬁts):
corev
 xA≥ vA A ∈ 2E\E
xE= vE
We ﬁrst state two elementary results known in the literature.
Proposition 2.1 (Kalai and Zemel [20]). Let E v be a simple ﬂow game, then
corev
 xP≥ 1 P ∈
xe ≥ 0 e ∈E
xE= vE
Theorem 2.1 (Kalai and Zemel [20]). For simple ﬂow games, corev is the convex hull of the incidence
vectors of min cuts.
By Observation 2 the next theorem gives the desired core result. We formulate it a bit stronger because this
is useful for proving the polynomial time results for the nucleolus and nucleon in §§2.2 and 2.3, respectively.
Theorem 2.2. Let E v be a simple ﬂow game with max ﬂow set P1     Pk, then
corev
 xP≥ 1 P ∈1
xP= 1 P ∈0
xe ≥ 0 e ∈M
xe = 0 e ∈D∪R
All inequalities can be satisﬁed strictly.
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Proof. Because of Observation 1, the above constraints imply xE=∑xPi= k= vE. By Lemma 2.1,
these constraints also imply xP ≥ 1 for each P ∈ . Hence, by Proposition 2.1, we have proved the above
core characterization is correct.
We now show that all inequalities can be satisﬁed strictly. Let [Si 
 T i], i= 1     n be a complete list of
all min cuts and let xi ∈E denote their incidence vectors. Because of Theorem 2.1, every x ∈ corev can be
written as x=∑i ,ixi such that ∑i ,i = 1. Hence, x¯= 1/n∑i xi is a core allocation that allocates x¯e ≥ 1/n
to every e ∈M and x¯P ≥ 1+ 1/n to every P ∈ 1, as P ∩ R =  by deﬁnition and, hence, P must pass at
least one min cut twice. 
2.2. The nucleolus of simple ﬂow games. Given an allocation x ∈ E for some game E v, we deﬁne
the excess of a nonempty coalition A E as eAx 
= xA− vA. We ﬁrst order all excesses eAx into a
nondecreasing sequence to obtain the excess vector .x ∈2E−2. The nucleolus of E v is then deﬁned as the
set of allocations that lexicographically maximize .x over all imputations, i.e., over all allocations x ∈E with
xe ≥ ve for all e ∈ E. Note that the nucleolus is not deﬁned if the set of imputations is empty. Otherwise,
due to a result by Schmeidler [26], the nucleolus consists of exactly one allocation.
We use the following alternative procedure (cf. Maschler et al. [22]) for computing the nucleolus of games
with a nonempty core such as ﬂow games. Let E v be a game with core(v) = . Then we might seek for an
allocation x ∈E satisfying all coalitions (core constraints) as much as possible by solving
LP1 /1 
= max/
xA≥ vA+ / A ∈ 2E\E
xE= vE
Note that /1 ≥ 0, as core(v) is nonempty. The set of allocations x ∈E for which x/1 is an optimum solution
of LP1 is known as the least core of E v. Note that the least core consists of those allocations that maximize
the smallest excess. This idea may be further pursued. Let 0 
= E and let 1 ⊆ 2E\0 denote the set of
coalitions A that get tight in LP1 in the sense that xA= vA+ /1 holds for every optimal solution x/1
of LP1. For ⊆ 2E , let  ⊆ 2E consist of all coalitions whose incidence vectors are linearly generated by
the incidence vectors of coalitions in . So, for example, any A ∈ 0 ∪1 has a ﬁxed value xA for each
x in the least core of v. We may thus seek to further increase xA for A ∈ 2E\0 ∪1, etc., leading to a
sequence of linear programs
LPr  /r 
= max/
xA≥ vA+ / A ∈ 2E\0 ∪ · · · ∪r−1
xA= vA+ /i A ∈i i= 0     r − 1
with /0 
= 0 and r ⊆ 2E\0 ∪ · · · ∪r−1 being recursively deﬁned as the set of coalitions A that get tight in
LPr  in the sense that xA= vA+ /r holds for every optimal solution x/r of LPr . We say that LPr 
ﬁxes A⊆E if A ∈ 0∪· · ·∪r\0∪· · ·∪r−1. Note that a coalition A can be ﬁxed by some LPr  without
ever getting tight.
The dimension of the feasible regions of LPr  decreases in each step, so we end up with a unique optimum
solution x∗ = x∗v, the nucleolus of E v, after at most m= E iterations. The nucleolus is in general difﬁcult
to compute, due to the exponentially many constraints in each LPr . However, for simple ﬂow games, this
can be done in polynomial time. Our main idea is the following. We ﬁx a max ﬂow set P1     Pk. After
excluding the case when E is an s–t path, we deduce that /1 = 0 and that the set of optimal solutions for LP1
simply coincides with the core, i.e., 0 ∪1 ⊆ 2E consists exactly of all coalitions generated by single edges
e⊆D ∪R and paths P ∈0 (cf. Theorem 2.2). As x ≡ 0 on D ∪R in linear programs LPr  with r ≥ 2, we
may apply Lemma 2.1. This enables one to disregard all coalitions not in D ∪R∪0 ∪1. Because the proof
for the nucleon in §2.3 goes along the same lines and the result for the nucleon is new, we leave out the proof
details of Theorem 2.3, which has been shown in Deng et al. [4] and Potters et al. [25] as well.
Theorem 2.3. The nucleolus of a simple ﬂow game can be computed in polynomial time.
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2.3. The nucleon of simple ﬂow games. A multiplicative variant of the nucleolus, the so-called nucleon,
has been introduced in Faigle et al.[8]. Assuming v≥ 0 (and v-worths representing proﬁts) this paper proposes
to solve
L̂Pr  /r 
= max/
xA≥ 1+ /vA A ∈ 2E\0 ∪ · · · ∪r−1
xA= 1+ /ivA A ∈i i= 0     r − 1
(where /0 = 0 and 0 = E) for r = 12    until vA= 0 holds for all A ∈ 2E\0 ∪ · · · ∪r−1. Strictly
speaking, the above sequence of linear programs leads to the prenucleon (because we do not restrict ourselves
to imputations only). However, if we assume that the core of a game E v is nonempty, /1 ≥ 0 holds, and
then the nucleon and prenucleon coincide. Because ﬂow games have a nonempty core, we can indeed make this
assumption.
In contrast to the nucleolus, the nucleon is not necessarily a single point. The complexity of the nucleolus
and nucleon might differ for a speciﬁc class of games, but in general also the nucleon is difﬁcult to compute,
due to the exponentially many constraints in each L̂Pr . However, we can efﬁciently compute the nucleon of a
simple ﬂow game by applying our method. To start with, we exclude the trivial exception that E is an s–t path
and ﬁrst observe that
L̂P1 /1 
= max/
xA≥ 1+ /vA A ∈ 2E\E
xE= vE
yields /1 = 0. This can be seen as follows. Theorem 2.2 implies /1 ≥ 0. Let P1     Pk be a max ﬂow set and
let x/1 be an optimal solution for L̂P1. Then x ≥ 0, and hence k= xE≥
∑k
i=1 xPi≥ 1+ /1k, which
implies /1 ≤ 0. So, the set of optimal solutions for L̂P1 simply coincides with the core, as was the case for
LP1. By Theorem 2.2, 0∪1 ⊆ 2E consists exactly of all coalitions generated by single edges e⊆D∪R
and paths P ∈0. Next let us turn to
L̂P2 /2 
= max/
xA≥ 1+ /vA A ∈ 2E\0 ∪1
xP= 1 P ∈0
xe = 0 e ∈D∪R
Which coalitions might get tight in L̂P2? First we ﬁx a max ﬂow set P1     Pk. We call A⊆E\0 ∪1
critical if A is of the form
Ae = e∪
⋃
h=m
Ph with e ∈ Pm ∩M
A
ij
lm = Psil ∪ Rij ∪Pjtm ∪
⋃
h=lm
Ph with l =m
Note that a coalition of the form Ae with e ∈ Pm∩M is not critical if and only if Pm consists of e. Furthermore,
each critical coalition of the form Aijlm corresponds to exactly one coalition P
si
l ∪ Rij ∪ Pjtm ∈ 1. Hence, the
number of critical coalitions is OE+1 =OV 2E2, and we can ﬁnd all critical coalitions in polynomial
time due to Observation 2.
We now show that for computing an allocation in the nucleon, it sufﬁces to consider the constraints for the
critical coalitions together with the single edge and path constraints (for paths in 0).
Theorem 2.4. An allocation in the nucleon of a simple ﬂow game can be computed in polynomial time.
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Proof. Let E v be a simple ﬂow game with vE = k. If k = 1, the nucleon coincides with the core
(we leave the proof to the reader). Suppose k ≥ 2. Fix some max ﬂow set P1     Pk of E v. Note that
vA= k− 1 if A is a critical coalition. We ﬁrst show that L̂P2 is equivalent to
LP∗2 /2 
= max/
xA≥ 1+ /k− 1 A is critical
xP= 1 P ∈0
xe = 0 e ∈D∪R
xe ≥ 0 e ∈M
We prove this by showing that any feasible solution x/ of LP∗2 is also feasible for L̂P2 (the reverse
implication is clear). As /2 >/1 = 0, we may assume /> 0. Let x/ be a solution of LP∗2. We need to show
that xA≥ 1+ /vA for all A ∈ 2E\0 ∪1.
Assume A ∈ 2E\0 ∪1, say, vA= l, i.e., there exist l edge-disjoint s–t paths P1     Pl ⊆ A. If l= k,
then P1     Pk form a max ﬂow set. By Observation 1, we obtain M ⊆ P1∪· · ·∪Pk and M ⊆ P1∪· · ·∪ Pk. The
latter implies M ⊆A. Because x≡ 0 on D∪R, we then ﬁnd xA= xM= x⋃ki=1 Pi= k. Then A ∈ 0∪1
holds, a contradiction. Hence, we may assume that l≤ k− 1.
If l= 0, there is nothing to show (as vA= l= 0). Hence, assume l ≥ 1. First, we prove a lower bound on
x P for all P ∈1. Recall that P˜ makes part of a critical coalition: Assume P = Psil ∪ Rij ∪Pjtm , then
xA
ij
lm= x
(
P ∪ ⋃
h=lm
Pk
)
= x P+ k− 2≥ 1+ /k− 1
So we ﬁnd that x P≥ 1+ /k− 1 for all P ∈1. We use this information to deduce a lower bound on xP
for each P ∈  P1     Pl. We can decompose such a P as in (1) and apply Lemma 2.1. If q = 1, we ﬁnd
xP= 1 (2)
If q ≥ 2, we ﬁnd
xP


= 1 if and only if all P* ∈0
≥ 1+ /k− 1 if exactly one P* ∈1
≥ 1+ 2/k− 1 else.
(3)
First assume none of P1     Pl intersect R. Then, by (2) and (3), x Pi= 1 and Pi ∈ 0∪1 for all i. Hence,
A\ P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pl must contain an edge e ∈M (as A  0 ∪1 and x ≡ 0 on D ∪R). Because vA= l, we
ﬁnd that e is not an edge from s to t. Then Ae is a critical coalition. Because x satisﬁes all critical constraints,
we have xAe≥ 1+ /k− 1, i.e.,
xe+ k− 1= xe+
∑
h=m
xPh≥ 1+ /k− 1
so xe ≥ /k− 1 > 0 (as a matter of fact, we proved this way that x > 0 on M) and, as required,
xA≥ xe+ x P1+ · · ·+ x Pl≥ /k− 1+ l≥ 1+ /l
Second, assume that at least one of the paths, say P1, intersects R. By (3), we obtain x P1≥ 1+ /k− 1 and
x Pi≥ 1 for i= 2     l. Then, as required,
xA≥ x P1+ x P2+ · · ·+ x Pl≥ l+ /k− 1≥ 1+ /l
The above actually shows more than what is claimed. Indeed, we see that the coalition A can get tight only
if l = k− 1. Furthermore, in the ﬁrst case (i.e., when  P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk−1 ∩ R = ), the set A\ P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk−1
may contain only a unique edge e ∈M (otherwise, x > 0 on M would imply xA > 1+ /k − 1). So A
gets tight (and ﬁxed) exactly when Ae gets tight, either in L̂P2 or in subsequent L̂Pr  for r ≥ 3. A similar
argument applies when  P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk−1∩R = 0. In this case, A can get tight only if there is exactly one path
P ∈  P1     Pk that intersects R and, in addition, there is exactly one P* in (3) with P* ∈1. Finally, A may
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not contain any edge e ∈M outside P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk−1. So, again, A can get tight only when the corresponding
critical coalition Aijlm gets tight (in some L̂Pr , r ≥ 2). But when Aijlm gets tight in, say L̂Pr , then P* gets ﬁxed
to 1+ /rk− 1, ﬁxing A to xA= 1+ /rk− 1.
Summarizing, our arguments show that we may completely disregard all constraints xA≥ 1+ /vA in
L̂Pr , r ≥ 2, for which A is noncritical. This amounts to saying that each L̂Pr  has only polynomially many
constraints and, hence, is efﬁciently solvable. 
3. The f -nucleolus of a ﬂow game. For a game E v we deﬁne a priority function as a mapping
f 
 2E → + to express a priority f A given to a coalition A (cf. Faigle et al. [6]). Assuming v ≥ 0 (and
v-worths representing proﬁts), we solve the following sequence of linear programs:
LPfr  /r 
= max/
xA≥ vA+ /f A A ∈ 2E\0 ∪ · · · ∪r−1
xA= vA+ /if A A ∈i i= 0     r − 1
(where /0 = 0 and 0 = E) for r = 12    until f A= 0 holds for all A ∈ 2E\0∪· · ·∪r−1. We then
have found the f -nucleolus of E v if core(v =  (because, otherwise, by deﬁnition we have to add in each
LPfr  the extra condition that x is an imputation.). Note that the f -nucleolus is not necessarily a single point.
We obtain the nucleolus if we choose f ≡ 1, the nucleon if f = v, and the per-capita nucleolus if f A= A
for all A⊆ E. Observe that these three priority functions have the property that f A > 0 whenever vA > 0.
This is a natural condition, and we call such a priority function suitable.
Below we present the main result of this section. The gadget used in the NP-hardness reduction has been
inspired by the gadget Deng et al. [4] used for proving NP-hardness of computing the nucleolus, but the
arguments we use are completely different.
Theorem 3.1. For any suitable priority function f , computing an allocation in the f -nucleolus is NP-hard
for the class of ﬂow games.
Proof. We use reduction from the NP-complete problem Exact 3-Cover (Garey and Johnson [13]). So,
we are given an undirected bipartite graph I deﬁned by bipartite classes UW with U  =m> q and W  = 3q
for some integer q such that each vertex u ∈ U is adjacent to exactly three vertices in W . The problem is to
decide if U contains an exact cover, i.e., a set C ⊆ U with C = q such that each w ∈W is adjacent to some
u ∈C. We may assume Nw ≥ 2 for all w ∈W (cf. Faigle et al. [6]).
From I we construct a ﬂow network G= V E as follows (cf. Figure 2). We add four new vertices: a source s,
a sink t and two other vertices x, y. We let E =E0 ∪E1 ∪E2 ∪E3 ∪ a b, where a= y t and b= x t and
E0 = s u  u ∈U8
E1 = uw  uw ∈EI (we directed the edges in EI from U to W )8
E2 = w y w ∈W8
E3 = u x  u ∈U
We deﬁne capacities ca = 3q, cb = 3m− 3q, c ≡ 3 on E0 ∪ E3 and c ≡ 1 on E1 ∪ E2. We observe that
vE= 3m. Furthermore, /1 = 0, and x ≡ 0 on E1 ∪E3 for any feasible solution x0 of LPf1 . This can be
seen as follows. Let e be an arbitrary edge in E1∪E3. By construction of G (recall each w ∈W has degree at least
two in I), we can choose a coalition A⊆E\e with vA= 3m. We deduce 3m= xE≥ xA≥ 3m+/1f A.
s
y
WU
t
x
Figure 2. The graph G given an instance U W of Exact 3-Cover.
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Because vA > 0, by deﬁnition, f A > 0, and we obtain /1 ≤ 0. Because ﬂow games have a nonempty core
(Kalai and Zemel [20]), we then ﬁnd /1 = 0. Now let x0 be a feasible solution of LPf1 . Then xe = 0
follows from x ≥ 0 together with xe = xe ∪ A− xA ≤ xE− vA = 3m− 3m = 0. Hence, indeed
x≡ 0 on E1 ∪E3.
We are now ready to formulate our claim, which immediately shows that computing an allocation in the
f -nucleolus is NP-hard. For an allocation x, we deﬁne min∗x= xb +minxE ′0E ′0 ⊂E0 and E ′0 =m− q.
Claim 1. The set U contains an exact cover if and only if min∗xf = 3m− 3q for each allocation xf in
the f -nucleolus of E v.
Note that computing min∗x for a given allocation x is easy, so indeed we are done after proving this claim.
The proof goes as follows. Suppose U contains an exact cover C. Let EC ⊂ E0 consist of all edges s u
for u ∈ C, and let E C = E0\EC . Note E C  = m− q. Deﬁne A = EC ∪ E1 ∪ E2 ∪ a and B = E C ∪ E3 ∪ b.
Then vA= 3q and vB= 3m− 3q. Now let xf be an allocation in the f -nucleolus of E v. Then xf 0
is a feasible solution of LPf1 , and consequently x
f ≡ 0 on E1 ∪ E3. Then 3m = xf E = xf A+ xf B ≥
vA + vB = 3q + 3m − 3q = 3m. Hence xf A = 3q and xf B = 3m − 3q. Because xf ≡ 0 on E3, we
obtain xfb + xf E C = xf B = 3m − 3q. For any other E ′0 ⊂ E0 with E ′0 = m − q we ﬁnd xfb + xf E ′0 =
xf E ′0 ∪E3 ∪ b≥ vE ′0 ∪E3 ∪ b= 3m− 3q. Hence min∗xf = 3m− 3q.
To prove the reverse implication suppose U does not contain an exact cover. We show that LPf2  can be
formulated as
LPf2 /2 
= max/
xA≥ vA+ /f A A ∈ 2E\E ee∈E1∪E3
xA= 0 A⊆E1 ∪E3
xE= 3m
Then, for any xf in the f -nucleolus of E v and any E ′0 ⊂E0 with E ′0 =m− q, we ﬁnd
x
f
b + xf E ′0 = xf E ′0 ∪E3 ∪ b
≥ vE ′0 ∪E3 ∪ b+ /2f E ′0 ∪E3 ∪ b
= 3m− 3q+ /2f E ′0 ∪E3 ∪ b
> 3m− 3q
and consequently min∗xf  > 3m− 3q (note f E ′0 ∪E3 ∪ b > 0 because vE ′0 ∪E3 ∪ b > 0).
We now deﬁne allocation x by xa = 3q− 3q:− q;− < xb = 3m− 3q− m− q;+ <, x≡ ; on E0, x ≡ 0
on E1 ∪E3, and x≡ : on E2 for sufﬁciently small ;> 0 and sufﬁciently small 0<:<< ; and are done after
showing that x0 is a feasible solution of LPf1  with xA > vA for all A E ee∈E1∪E3.
So, let A be a coalition not in E ee∈E1∪E3. Then xA > 0 for sufﬁciently small ;:< > 0. If vA= 0,
then xA > 0 = vA. Suppose vA > 0. Then a b ∩ A = . First assume a ∈ A, b  A. Because xf ≡ 0
on E1, we may without loss of generality assume E1 ⊂A. Let E0∩A=E ′0 and let E2∩A=E ′2. If E ′0 ≤ q, then
vA≤ 3q− 1 (because otherwise U would have an exact cover), and we ﬁnd
xA− vA ≥ ;E ′0 +:E ′2 + 3q− 3q:− q;− <− 3q− 1
= 1+;E′0 − q+:E ′2 − 3q− <> 0
if we have chosen ;:< > 0 sufﬁciently small. If E ′0 ≥ q+ 1, then vA≤ 3q, and we ﬁnd
xA− vA ≥ ;E′0 +:E ′2 + 3q− 3q:− q;− <− 3q
= ;E′0 − q+:E ′2 − 3q− <> 0
if we have chosen ;> 0 and 0<:<< ; sufﬁciently small.
Second, assume aA, b ∈A. Because xf ≡ 0 on E3, we may without loss of generality assume E3 ⊂A. Let
E0 ∩A=E ′0. If E ′0 ≤m− q− 1, then
xA− vA = ;E′0 + 3m− 3q− m− q;+ <− 3E′0
≥ 3+;E ′0 −m+ q+ <> 0
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if we have chosen ;> 0 sufﬁciently small. If E ′0 ≥m− q, then
xA− vA= ;E′0 + 3m− 3q− m− q;+ <− 3m− 3q≥ <> 0
If both ab ∈A, then vA≤ 3m− 1, because otherwise A ∈ E ee∈E1∪E3. Hence
xA− vA ≥ xa+ xb − 3m+ 1
= 3q− 3q:− q;− <+ 3m− 3q− m− q;+ <− 3m+ 1
= −3q:−m;+ 1> 0
for ;, : sufﬁciently small. This completes our proof. 
Because of Theorem 3.1 we immediately ﬁnd the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Computing the nucleolus, the per-capita nucleolus and the nucleon are NP-hard problems
for the class of ﬂow games.
4. Conclusions. We presented a new combinatorial method by which we obtain efﬁcient algorithms for com-
puting the core, nucleolus, and nucleon of simple ﬂow games. We also showed that for (general) ﬂow games,
computing an allocation in the f -nucleolus is NP-hard for all suitable priority functions f . As a consequence,
computing the nucleolus, per-capita nucleolus, and nucleon are NP-hard problems for the class of ﬂow games.
This generalizes the NP-hardness result in Deng et al. [4] for the nucleolus. The following questions are
interesting.
1. Is computing the per capita nucleolus, or more generally, the f -nucleolus of a simple ﬂow game polyno-
mially solvable for all suitable priority functions f ?
2. Can the class of simple ﬂow games be extended to a larger subclass of ﬂow games for which efﬁcient
algorithms exist for computing the core, nucleolus, or nucleon?
Answering question 1 might not be an easy task. A similar study for matching games is still unﬁnished.
Computing the nucleon of a matching game can be done in polynomial time (Faigle et al. [8]). However, the
complexity of computing the nucleolus of a matching game is still a wide open problem.
Because the nucleolus for matching games deﬁned on an undirected graph G = V E with edge weights
wu v=wu+wv for vertex weights w ∈V+ can be efﬁciently computed (Paulusma [24]), a candidate for
an answer to question 2 might be the subclass of ﬂow games that are deﬁned on a network G= V E with
edge capacities cu v= cu+ cv for vertex capacities c ∈V+.
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